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The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a great health and 
development challenge. According to the World 
Health Organization (WHO), 36.7 million peo-
ple were living with the HIV virus in 2015. 
Around 70 percent of those lived in  sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is well known that number of sexual 
partners matters for the transmission of HIV. To 
the extent that marriage reduces the number of 
partners that a person has it may play an import-
ant role in mitigating the transmission of HIV. 
Despite its significance, the literature has not 
provided models in which marriage provides 
a haven for safer sex. This paper investigates, 
using a calibrated choice-theoretic general equi-
librium model, how policies aimed at increasing 
marriage rates affect HIV prevalence rates. The 
analysis highlights the role that marriage as an 
institution plays in the transmission of HIV. It 
also illustrates that policies aimed at marriage 
may have important effects.
Choice-theoretic models of infectious dis-
eases are rare, and those entertaining marriage 
are virtually nonexistent. Epidemiological 
models do not incorporate rational, maximiz-
ing behavior by individuals. Kremer (1996) 
builds some behavior into an epidemiologi-
cal model, but his framework is not designed 
for  quantitative analysis. An exception is the 
choice-theoretic general equilibrium model by 
Greenwood et al. (2017). They develop a quanti-
tative search model with various choice margins: 
marriage or short-term sexual relationships, the 
latter with or without a condom. Their model 
is calibrated to the Malawian data. It is used 
to understand the impact of medical interven-
tions aimed at changing transmission risk and 
mortality: antiretroviral treatment (ART) and 
circumcision in particular. The analysis allows 
for feedback effects in equilibrium, arising from 
changing behavior and shifts in the prevalence 
of HIV. The current study extends their analy-
sis to focus on a different set of interventions, 
which do not alter transmission risk in a medical 
sense, but instead target the institution of mar-
riage. Specifically, it studies social interventions 
aimed at encouraging marriage and dissuading 
divorce.
I. Model Description
For the sake of space, only a brief descrip-
tion of the model is given here; for details, see 
Greenwood et al. (2017). Imagine an economy 
populated with men and women that are born 
each period as healthy individuals. They may 
engage in sex, which is a risky decision because 
of the presence of the HIV/AIDS virus. A per-
son may have short-term or long-term relation-
ships (aka marriages). A condom, which reduces 
the likelihood of contracting the virus, may or 
may not be used in a short-term relationship. 
Condoms are never used within a marriage. It is 
assumed that married individuals are faithful to 
their partners. In order to find a partner, a person 
must exert a costly search effort. A person can 
always choose to be abstinent by not searching 
for a partner.
Individuals live for multiple periods, subject 
to a survival probability. They discount future 
utility. People are heterogeneous with respect 
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to their discount factor; i.e., some individuals 
are patient and others aren’t. In particular, as 
people age they may stochastically switch to 
becoming more patient. This feature captures 
the fact that young individuals are more inclined 
to engage in risky behavior than are older ones. 
The period utility depends on one’s consump-
tion and whether he or she had sex. Having pro-
tected sex in the period (i.e., using a condom) 
yields instantaneous utility  p . Unprotected sex 
is valued by the person at  u > p . Following evi-
dence from Malawi, all sex within long-term 
relationships is unprotected. Within marriage, 
an individual realizes extra utility (a benefit or 
cost) from the partnership, given by  l ⋛  0 , so 
that the instantaneous utility of sex is given by 
u + l . The parameter  l plays a starring role in the 
story to be told; it controls the exogenous benefit 
from marriage.
When a healthy individual has sex with an 
infected partner, he or she may contract the 
virus. Following the medical evidence, the 
probability of infection is assumed to be higher 
for women than for men. This probability is 
lower for both genders when a condom is used. 
Moreover, men may be circumcised or not. 
Circumcised men are less likely to contract the 
virus.1 For simplicity, after each period all indi-
viduals get tested for HIV. So, they know their 
infection status after one period. The results 
of the test are an individual’s private informa-
tion. An infected individual has a probability of 
developing HIV/AIDS symptoms. When symp-
toms develop, an individual has a higher chance 
of dying. Assume that people with symptoms 
are too sick to engage in sexual relationships.
Each person must exert effort in order to 
find a partner. Since there are different types of 
relationships, this search effort may be directed 
toward three different “markets.” All partici-
pants in the first market are seeking a protected 
short-term relationship. In the second market, 
matched individuals engage in unprotected 
short-term relations. Finally, in the third market, 
people marry and form long-term partnerships. 
Search is costly in terms of utility. On this, it is 
1 Another variable that affects the transmission of the 
HIV/AIDS virus is whether the individual is under ART. 
The analysis uses Malawian data for 2004, when virtually 
nobody was treated. So, ART is abstracted from here. See 
Greenwood et al. (2017) for an analysis of the impact of 
ART. 
presumed that finding a partner in the long-term 
market is more costly than finding a partner in 
one of the short-term markets. Each market is 
uniquely characterized by the types of people 
that enter it: healthy/sick women and healthy/
sick men (who may be circumcised or not). 
People know the prevalence rate of HIV in each 
of the three markets, implied by the composi-
tion of the participants. An equilibrium transfer 
between men and women guarantees that each 
market clears. These transfers represent court-
ship costs. Individuals first search in the long-
term market. If he or she is not matched, the 
person moves to the short-term markets where 
s/he may search simultaneously both in the 
protected and unprotected markets. If matched 
in the long-term market, the relationship can 
break up due to one of the spouses developing 
symptoms or due to an exogenous divorce shock 
that hits the couple with probability ϵ. This 
parameter is also central in the analysis because 
it governs the duration of a marriage. A person 
chooses their search behavior to maximize their 
expected discounted lifetime utility.
The analysis will focus on steady states. An 
equilibrium for this economy is a collection 
of prices, value functions, policy functions for 
search effort, and distributions of individuals 
in each market such that: (i) each person maxi-
mizes his or her expected lifetime utility, given 
prices and prevalence rates; (ii) prices adjust to 
clear all three sex markets; and (iii) aggregate 
HIV rates in all markets are consistent with the 
behavior of men and women.
II. Calibration
Some parameter values for the model are 
chosen following evidence from the medical 
literature. These parameters are the female-to-
male and male-to-female transmission rates for 
protected and unprotected sex, which can also 
vary depending upon whether the male is cir-
cumcised or not. The number of circumcised 
males is taken from the Malawian data. Other 
parameters (mostly related to preferences) are 
calibrated such that the moments generated 
from the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model line up with their data counter-
parts. Statistics regarding sexual behavior and 
HIV prevalence rates in Malawi are used as data 
targets. The model fit is good in terms of tar-
geted and non-targeted statistics, except for the 
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marriage rate for young women. In  particular, 
the model does a good job hitting life cycle and 
cross-country moments that were not used in 
the calibration. See Greenwood et al. (2017) for 
details.
III. Results
Table 1 presents the results. Column 1, panel 
A, provides some data for Malawi regarding 
both HIV prevalence rates and some measures 
of sexual behavior. Women exhibit a higher 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS than men. This gender 
asymmetry arises because the male-to-female 
transmission rate is higher than the female-to-
male rate. The benchmark model also displays 
such a pattern, albeit a little weaker, as can be 
seen in column 2, panel A. The fraction of casual 
encounters is 18 percent in the data, a number 
closely matched by the model. A condom is used 
in around one third of short-term relationships, 
both in the data and model. The fraction of sin-
gles in the population is slightly higher in the 
model (48 percent versus 33 in the data).
Two experiments will now be entertained; viz, 
an increase in  l and a decrease in ϵ. Recall that  l 
measures the exogenous extra period utility from 
being in a marriage. So, an upward movement in 
l can be thought of as a policy that encourages 
marriage. Such a shift should raise the flow into 
marriage. Designing tax and welfare systems 
to support marriage are commonly mentioned 
policies. Promoting abstinence before marriage 
and providing marriage skills courses are oth-
ers. Remember that ϵ controls the probability of 
divorce. Hence, a drop in ϵ corresponds to a pol-
icy that dissuades divorce. A fall in ϵ reduces the 
exit rate from marriage and therefore raises the 
duration of a long-term relationship. Providing 
marriage counseling services, promoting faith-
fulness through churches, or requiring divorced 
fathers to pay child support are examples of pol-
icies in this regard.
A. General Equilibrium Experiments
First, consider the impact of a policy that pro-
motes marriage, or that increases  l . The results 
for this experiment are reported in column 3, 
panel A. The fraction of singles decreases in the 
benchmark model from 48 to 44 percent. The 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate drops to 8.4 per-
cent. Second, entertain the impact of a policy 
that dissuades divorce, or that decreases ϵ. Now, 
for comparability purposes, the decline in ϵ is 
engineered to deliver the same drop in singles 
as the previous experiment. Note, however, that 
the HIV prevalence rate now falls by a smaller 
amount to 9.6 percent (column 4, panel A). So, 
promoting marriage appears to be more effective 
than dissuading divorce on this dimension.
One of the reasons for the discrepancy in 
prevalence rates across the two experiments is 
the timing of entry into marriage. Although, by 
construction, the number of singles decreases by 
the same amount in both experiments, the tim-
ing for a first marriage is different. Note that the 
fraction of married men and women by age 22 
increases substantially in the promote-marriage 
experiment, whereas it does so by a much lower 
magnitude in the reduce-divorce counterfactual. 
Therefore, the young move faster into safer long-
term relationships in the promote-marriage exer-
cise. Consequently, they spend a shorter time as 
a young single. And, young singles tend to be 
more promiscuous and have a higher proclivity 
to engage in unprotected sex, because they have 
lower discount factors.
Condom usage increases in both experiments 
by about 1 percentage point. More of an indi-
vidual’s life will be lived in long-term rela-
tionships (where sex is assumed to be always 
unprotected). Hence, a person opts for a safer 
alternative while single, even though that brings 
less enjoyment.
B. Small Field Experiments
Small field experiments apply some sort 
of “treatment” to a small group of individuals 
and then examine the upshot. To mimic a small 
field experiment in the choice-theoretic general 
equilibrium model, shifts in the behavior of indi-
viduals are not allowed to affect the aggregate 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the three types 
of markets for relationships. The idea here is 
that because a small field experiment is local in 
nature, it cannot have a global impact on econo-
my-wide aggregates. Thus, a small field experi-
ment is a partial equilibrium investigation.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the results for the 
small field experiments. Interpret these numbers 
as what happens to the small group of individu-
als who are subjected to the experiment; i.e., the 
“treated” group. The macro aggregates for soci-
ety are not affected by the experiment because 
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it applies to a measure zero set of individuals. 
Therefore, the macro aggregates remain con-
stant at the benchmark model values (column 2, 
panel A).
Focus initially on the promote-marriage 
scenario in column 3. Note that the HIV prev-
alence rate in the small field experiment drops (by slightly less compared with its equilibrium 
counterpart) from 10.3 to 8.7 percent (compare 
column 2, panel A, with column 3, panel B). 
Now, in the small field experiment the treated 
group is still interacting with a population at 
large that is just as risky as that in the benchmark 
equilibrium. The behavioral response of the 
treated group to the policy leads to a substantial 
reduction in the prevalence of the  disease for the 
Table 1—Data, Benchmark Model, and Experiments
Malawian Benchmark Marriage Divorce
data model  l ↑  ϵ ↓ 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Equilibrium experiments
HIV/AIDS rate 11.8 10.3 8.4 9.6
 Men 10 8.6 7.1 8.1
 Women 13 12.1 9.8 11.2
Casual sex 18 15.7 13.5 14.0
Casual sex with condom 39 32.8 33.9 33.7
Singles, sex last year 37 53.5 54.2 54.2
Singles 33 48.0 44.0 44.0
Married by age 22, men 58 57.2 63.9 59.0
Married by age 22, women 90 62.6 68.4 64.5
Panel B. Small field experiments
HIV/AIDS rate 8.7 9.6
 Men 6.8 8.0
 Women 10.7 11.4
Casual sex 12.9 14.0
Casual sex with condom 34.7 33.6
Singles, sex last year 54.0 54.7
Singles 43.0 43.6
Married by age 22, men 66.6 60.5
Married by age 22, women 66.8 64.0





Casual sex with condom 33.0
Singles, sex last year 54.3
Singles 45.4
Married by age 22, men 57.2
Married by age 22, women 62.6
Notes: Column 1 shows the Malawian data. The results from the benchmark DSGE model are 
displayed in column 2. Column 3 shows the results from a policy experiment aiming to promote 
marriage. This is operationalized by letting  l rise from −4.8 to −4.2. The results from a policy 
experiment dissuading divorce are presented in column 4. Here ϵ falls from 0.03 to 0.025. For 
the small field experiments the feedback loop is shut down from individual behavior to the aggre-
gate prevalence rates in each of the three relationship markets. That is, the small field experiment 
is not allowed to affect economy-wide aggregates. Therefore, the results reported for the small 
field experiment are for the “treated” subjects only and are not the economy-wide aggregates, 
which remain the same as in column 2. In the epidemiological experiment the search intensities, 
for each type of individual, from the benchmark DSGE model are used; i.e., individual behavior 
is not allowed to change. All numbers in the table are in percents.
Source: See Greenwood et al. (2017) for the Malawian data sources and a complete description 
of the DSGE benchmark model, together with a listing of all parameter values used.
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experimental subjects. In fact, these behavioral 
responses are stronger than in the equilibrium 
experiment (compare column 3, panel A with 
column 3, panel B). For instance, the number of 
singles decreases 1 percentage point further to 
43 percent. In the small field experiment there 
are more infected people in aggregate than in 
the equilibrium experiment. Hence, people look 
harder for safer long-term relationships. Note 
also that, in comparison with the equilibrium 
experiment, the fraction of men and women 
married by age 22 increases by an even larger 
extent. Moreover, while single, individuals in 
the small field experiment also behave more 
cautiously. The fraction of people that use con-
doms rises by approximately 1 percentage point (over the equilibrium experiment) and the frac-
tion of singles who had sex in the previous year 
declines slightly.
Now turn attention to the small field exper-
iment for the reduce-divorce counterfactual (column 4, panel B). The HIV prevalence rate 
wanes from 10.3 to 9.6 percent (contrast column 
2, panel A with column 4, panel B). In fact, this 
decline is very similar to what was obtained in 
the equilibrium experiment (column 4, panel A). 
This suggests that most of the effect from the 
reduce-divorce policy comes from behavioral 
changes and not from equilibrium effects, as will 
be seen in the next subsection. Not surprisingly 
then, behavior in the small field experiment is 
very similar to the equilibrium version.
C. Epidemiological Experiment
Epidemiological studies typically hold human 
behavior fixed after shifts in public policy. To 
capture this, the search intensities in the three 
markets for various relationships are taken, for 
each type of individual, from the benchmark 
equilibrium model. These are then used in the 
epidemiological experiment. The epidemio-
logical experiment can only be conducted for 
the reduce-divorce policy. To understand why, 
consider the promote-marriage scenario. Here, 
the utility benefit of marriage is increased. This 
can only operate through changes in behav-
ior. If changes in behavior are shut down, then 
policies that promote marriage cannot have an 
effect. Turn attention now to the reduce-divorce 
policy. This does have effects beyond shifts in 
behavior. Changing the exogenous probability 
of divorce, ϵ , mechanically alters the duration of 
a marriage and consequently the flow of people 
from  married into single life, even when behav-
ior is held fixed. This has an impact on society’s 
health.
The results for the epidemiological experi-
ment for the reduce-divorce policy are reported 
in column 4, panel C. Here, the HIV prevalence 
rate only drops slightly from 10.3 to 10.1 per-
cent (juxtapose column 2, panel A with column 
4, panel C). To explain this, observe that the 
number of singles does not fall as much as in 
the equilibrium experiment (column 4, panel A 
versus column 4, panel C). The extra marriages 
that result in the equilibrium experiment are due 
to behavioral adjustments. If given the chance, 
individuals search harder for long-term relation-
ships, because they know these will now last 
longer and this economizes on search costs.
As just discussed, the behavioral shifts in the 
equilibrium reduce-divorce experiment rein-
force the mechanical effect on marriage due to 
a decrease in the rate of divorce. This contrasts 
with the behavioral responses from medical 
experiments. Suppose some treatment makes an 
individual less likely to contract the virus. This 
mechanically induces a force that will reduce 
HIV, holding fixed behavior. When faced with 
the lower odds of contracting HIV, however, 
individuals will engage in riskier activities. 
This increase in risky sexual activity works to 
counteract the effect that the reduction in trans-
mission risk has on HIV. See Greenwood et al. (2017) for a discussion of these effects.
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